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Abstract
Auditing is an increasingly important operation for computer programming, for example in secur-
ity (e.g. to enable history-based access control) and to enable reproducibility and accountability
(e.g. provenance in scientific programming). Most proposed auditing techniques are ad hoc or
treat auditing as a second-class, extralinguistic operation; logical or semantic foundations for
auditing are not yet well-established. Justification Logic (JL) offers one such foundation; Bavera
and Bonelli introduced a computational interpretation of JL called λh that supports auditing.
However, λh is technically complex and strong normalization was only established for special
cases. In addition, we show that the equational theory of λh is inconsistent. We introduce a new
calculus λhc that is simpler than λh, consistent, and strongly normalizing. Our proof of strong
normalization is formalized in Nominal Isabelle.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.4.1 Mathematical Logic
Keywords and phrases Lambda calculus, Justification Logic, Strong Normalization, Audited
Computation
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1 Introduction
Auditing is of increasing importance in many areas, including in security (e.g. history-
based access control [1], evidence-based audit [25, 15]) and to provide reproducibility or
accountability for scientific computations (e.g. provenance tracking [3]). To date, most
approaches to auditing propose to instrument programs in some ad hoc way, to provide a
record of the computation, sometimes called provenance, audit log, trace, or trail, which is
typically meant to be inspected after the computation finishes. Foundations of provenance
or auditing have not been fully developed, and auditing typically remains a second-class
citizen (or even an alien concept), in that trails are not accessible to the program itself during
execution, but only to an external monitoring layer. We seek logical and semantic foundations
for self-auditing programs that provide first-class recording and auditing primitives.
In this paper, we explore how ideas from justification logic [5] (a generalization of the
Logic of Proofs [6]) can provide such a foundation. Justification Logic is the general name for
a family of logics that refine the epistemic reading of modal necessity A (“A is known”) by
indexing such formulas with justifications, or (descriptions of) evidence that A holds. So, the
formula JaKA can be read as “justification a is evidence (proof) establishing A”. In elementary
forms of justification logic, the justifications consist of uninterpreted constants that can be
combined with algebraic operations (e.g. formal sum and product). A representative axiom
of justification logic is the evidence-aware version of Modus Ponens:
JaK (A ⊃ B) ⊃ JbKA ⊃ Ja · bKB
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XX:2 Strongly Normalizing Audited Computation
which can be read as “if a proves A ⊃ B and b proves A then a together with b proves B”.
Another representative axiom is the reflection principle:
JaKA ⊃ J!aK JaKA
which can be read as “if a proves A then !a proves that a proves A”, where ! is a reflection
operator on justifications. Notice that in both cases, if we ignore the evidence annotations
a, b, we get standard axioms “K” and “4” of modal logic respectively [16].
This paper explores using (constructive) justification logic as a foundation for programming
with auditing, building on of previous work on calculi for modal logic [22] and justification
logic [7, 9]. Artemov and Bonelli [7] introduced the intensional lambda calculus λI, which
builds upon Pfenning and Davies’ type theory for modal logic [22] by recording proof codes in
judgements and modalities; proof codes are a special case of proof terms. In λI, “trails” that
witness the equivalence of proof codes were introduced, but these trails could not be inspected
by other constructs. More recently, Bavera and Bonelli [9] introduced λh, an extension of λI
that allowed trail inspection, which can audit a computation’s trail of evaluation from the
currently-enclosing box constructor up to the point of inspection.
Trail inspection is a first-class construct of λh, and can be performed at arbitrary program
points (including inside another trail inspection). Bavera and Bonelli outlined how this
construct can be used to implement history-based access control [1] policies in which access
control decisions are made based on the complete previous call history. Trail inspection
could also be used for profiling, for example by counting the number of calls of each function
in a subcomputation, or for more general auditing [4], for example by comparing the trails
of multiple computations to look for differences or anomalies in their execution history.
Furthermore, all of these applications can be supported in a single language, rather than
requiring ad hoc changes to accommodate different monitoring semantics. (It is worth
noting that these applications typically use data structures such as sets or maps that are not
provided in λh; however, they are straightforward to add.)
Bavera and Bonelli proved basic metatheoretic properties of λh including subject reduction,
and gave a partial proof of strong normalization. The latter proof considered only terms
in which there was no nesting of box constructors. Although they conjectured that strong
normalization holds for the full system, the general case was left as an open question. However,
λh is a somewhat complex system, due to subtle aspects of the metatheory of trail inspection.
Trails are viewed as proof terms witnessing equivalence of proof codes. Proof codes include
trail inspections, whose results depend on the history of the term being executed. λh’s trails
are viewed as equality proofs and are thus subject to symmetry: operationally, the language
provides a trail constructor s(q) that converts a trail q of type s = t to one of type t = s.
Since the reduct of an outer trail inspection depends on a non-local, volatile context (the
trail declared in the nearest outer box constructor) symmetry makes it possible to equate
any two codes of the same type: in other words, the theory of trails becomes inconsistent.
To avoid this problem, Bavera and Bonelli annotated trail inspections with affine trail
variables α, α′ representing the volatile context, and trail inspection is then denoted by
αθ, where θ is a collection of functions specifying a structural recursion over the trail.
Nevertheless, in λh we can prove any two codes s and t equivalent. A detailed example,
along with the rules of λh, are presented in Appendix A; here, we sketch the derivation:
s = q1θ q1θ = αθ
s = αθ
t = q2θ q2θ = αθ
t = αθ
αθ = t (*)
s = t
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where q1, q2 and θ are chosen so that s = q1θ and t = q2θ, which is possible whenever s and
t have the same type. The problem seems to originate from the transitivity rule marked with
(*), which constitutes an exception to the affineness of trail variables, since the same proof
code must necessarily appear as the right-hand side of the first premise and as the left-hand
side of the second one. This allows trail inspection on α to be triggered twice. It should
be noted that this property does not contradict any proved results by Bavera and Bonelli;
instead, it can be viewed as an (undesirable) form of proof-irrelevance: that is, JsKA→ JtKA
is inhabited for any well-formed proof codes s, t. Of course, if this is the case then the stated
justification s for JsKA need have nothing with to do its actual proof, defeating the purpose
of introducing the proof codes in the first place.
We present a new calculus, λhc, that overcomes these issues with λh, and provides a more
satisfactory foundation for audited computation, including the following contributions:
We dispense with λh’s trail variables, instead adopting a trail inspection construct ι(θ)
that can be used anywhere in the program. We also adjust λh’s treatment of trails by no
longer viewing them as witnesses to proof code equality but rather to (directed) reducibility.
At a technical level, this simply consists of dropping the symmetry axiom and trail form.
Viewing trails as asymmetric reducibility proofs means that it is no longer inconsistent to
relate a trail inspection redex with all of its possible contracta nondeterministically, and
it also obviates the need for trail variables (or ordinary variables) to be affine; once we lift
these restrictions, however, the rationale for trail variables evaporates. We present the
improved system, and summarize its metatheory (including a proof that its equational
theory is consistent) in Section 2.
To show that λhc is well-behaved, we prove strong normalization (SN). Our proof of SN
actually shows a stronger result: SN holds even if we conservatively assume that trail
inspection operations can choose any well-formed trail; this is a useful insight because
it means that we can extend the result to more realistic languages with more complex
trails. We summarize this proof, which we fully formalized in Nominal Isabelle1
Section 4 discusses related work: in particular, we argue that our approach can be used
to prove strong normalization for λh as well, even in the presence of the symmetry rule.
2 A history-aware calculus
2.1 Overview
In this section we describe λhc, an extension of the simply-typed lambda calculus allowing
for several forms of auditing, thanks to an internalized notion of computation history. It is
based in many respects on λh, but since our preferred notation differs in important details
we give a self-contained presentation.
Operationally, we add to the simply typed λ-calculus a new term form !qM , where M
is an expression and q is a trail containing a symbolic description of the past history of
M . History-aware expressions will be given their own type: if M has type A, and q is an
appropriate trail showing how M has reduced, then the type of !qM will be indicated byJsKA; the symbol ‘!’ is called “bang”. In our language, we will initially evaluate expressions in
the form ! M , where the absence of a subscript indicates that no computation has happened
1 The full formalization can be found at http://www.wilmer-ricciotti.net/FORMAL/ccau.tgz. A more
detailed discussion can be found in the extended version of this paper.
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within M yet. As we reduce M , the bang will be annotated with a subscript, for example
! M  !qN
where q must explain how N was obtained from the initial expression M .
As a slightly more involved example, we consider the following expression:
! if (1 ?= 2) M N
Here, ?= represents an equality test between integers, while M and N represent respectively
the ‘then’ and ‘else’ branches of the if statement. To evaluate the expression, we first
reduce the equality test to #F (boolean false), and the if to its ‘else’ branch. In λhc, this
computation will be described as:
! if (1 ?= 2) M N  !Q[q]if #F M N  !t(Q[q],q′)N
where q, Q, and q′ are defined in such a way that:
q explains how 1 ?= 2 reduces to #F
Q is a context indicating that q was applied to the guard of an if statement – in other
words, it describes a congruence rule of reduction
q′ describes the reduction of if #F · · · to its ‘else’ branch
t combines its two arguments by means of transitivity.
To make use of history-aware expressions, we will also provide constructs to access their
contents or to inspect their history.
2.2 Syntax
We now give the formal definition of λhc. The language includes three syntactic classes,
which we have already presented informally in the overview:
codes s, t correspond to (extended) lambda expressions which have not been evaluated
yet: in other words, they only contain bangs with no history
trails q, q′ encode the history of the computation transforming a certain code into another
terms M,N are lambda expressions that have been partially evaluated: they are similar
to codes, but their bangs are annotated with trails.
The types of the language (denoted by metavariables A,B,C, . . .) include atomic types
P , functions A ⊃ B, and audited units JsKA. Notice that types contain codes, which can
contain types in turn. Audited types correspond to terms that capture and record all the
computation happening inside them, for subsequent retrieval.
The syntax of the language is presented in Figure 1. Codes and terms are defined in
a similar way to Pfenning and Davies [22]. We use the symbol ‘!’ (“bang”) to denote box
introduction in both codes and terms; the corresponding elimination form is given by the let
operator, which unpacks an audited code or term allowing us to access its contents. The
variable declared by a let is bound in its second argument: in essence, let(u := !qM,N) will
reduce to N , where u has been replaced by M ; q will be used to produce a trail explaining
this reduction.
I Example 1. λhc allows us to manipulate history-carrying data explicitly. For instance, we
could have the following history-carrying natural numbers:
!q2 : J1 + 1KN !q′6 : Jfact 3KN
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Codes: Terms:
s, t, . . . ::= a M,N, . . . ::= a simple variable
| u | u audited variable
| λaA.s | λaA.M abstraction
| (s t) | (M N) application
| !s | !qM box introduction
| let(uA := s, t) | let(uA := M,N) box elimination
| ι(θ) | ι(ϑ) trail inspection
Trails: Trail inspection branches:
q, q′, . . . ::= r(s) reflexivity θ, θ′, . . . ::= {−−→s/ψ} for codes
| t(q, q′) transitivity ϑ, ϑ′, . . . ::= {−−−→M/ψ} for terms
| β(aA.s, t) beta reduction ζ, ζ′, . . . ::= {−−→q/ψ} for trails
| β(s, uA.t) box beta reduction Trail inspection branch labels:
| ti(q, θ) trail inspection reduction ψ,ψ′, . . . ::= r | t | β | β | ti
| lam(aA.q) congruence wrt lambda | lam | app | let
| app(q, q′) congruence wrt application | trpl[] | trpl:: | d
| let(q, uA.q′) congruence wrt let
| trpl(ζ) congruence wrt trail insp.
Figure 1 Syntax of λhc
The trail q represents the history of 2, i.e. a witness to the computation that produced 2 by
adding 1 + 1; similarly, q′ describes how computing fact 3 (for a suitable definition of the
factorial function) yielded 6.
Now supposing we wish to add these two numbers together, at the same time retaining
their history, we will use the let construct to look inside them:
! let(uN := !q2, let(vN := !q′6, u+v))
∗ !q′′8 :
q
let(uN := ! 1 + 1, let(vN := ! fact 3, u+ v))
y
N
where the type of the terms is preserved under reduction, and the final trail q′′, produced by
composing q and q′, is expected to log the reductions of 1 + 1, of fact 3, and of the two lets.
Trail inspection codes and terms will perform computation by primitive recursion on
a certain trail, which represents an audited unit’s computation history. Trail inspection
references the computation history of the current context (ι(θ) and ι(ϑ)). Here, θ and ϑ
contain the branches that define the recursion.
The only difference between codes and terms is that in terms, bang operators are
annotated with a trail q: this follows the intuition that terms are codes considered with their
computational evolution. Trails represent (multi-step) reductions relating two codes: thus,
their structure matches the derivation tree of the reduction itself.
In this definition, when a trail contains an argument composed of a variable and another
expression separated by a dot, the variable should be considered bound in that expression.
The constructors β,β and ti define atomic reductions: β represents the regular β-reduction;
β is similar, but reduces a let-bang combination; finally, ti reduces trail inspections. The
constructors lam, app, let, and trpl provide congruence rules for all code constructors (with
the notable exception of bangs, since trails are not allowed to escape an audited unit): for
example, if q is a trail from s to t, lam(aA.q) constructs a trail from λaA.s to λaA.t. Finally,
the definition of trails is completed by reflexivity and transitivity (but excluding symmetry).
Notice that reflexive trails take as a parameter the code whose identity is stated (for brevity,
we will keep this parameter implicit in our examples).
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I Example 2. We can build a pair of natural numbers using Church’s encoding: λhc makes
it possible to keep a log of this operation without adding specialized code:
! ((λx, y, p.p x y) 2) 6
 !t(r,app(β(x.λy,p.p x y,2),r)) (λy, p.p 2 y) 6
 !t(t(r,app(β(x.λy,p.p x y,2),r)),β(y.λp.p 2 y,6)) λp.p 2 6
The trail for the first computation step is obtained by transitivity (trail costructor t) from
the original trivial trail (r, i.e. reflexivity) composed with β(x.λy, p.p x y, 2), which describes
the beta-reduction of (λx, y, p.p x y) 2: this subtrail is wrapped in a congruence app because
the reduction takes place deep inside the left-hand subterm of an application (the other
argument of app is reflexivity, because no reduction takes place in the right-hand subterm).
The second beta-reduction happens at the top level and is thus not wrapped in a
congruence. It is combined with the previous trail by means of transitivity.
Inspection branches θ, ϑ and ζ are maps from trail constructors to codes, terms, or trails.
More precisely, since some of the trail constructors have a variable arity, in that case we
need to distinguish a nil case ([]) and a cons case (::) to specify the corresponding branch of
recursion; in addition, we do not require the map to be exhaustive, but allow a “default”,
catch-all branch specified using the label d: this does not make the language more expressive,
but will allow us to extend the language with additional constants without needing to modify
the base syntax. We now give a formal definition of the result of trail inspection.
I Definition 3. The operation qθ, which produces a code by structural recursion on q
applying the inspection branches θ, is defined as follows:
ψ(_)θ , θ(d) (if ψ /∈ dom(θ)) lam(aA.q)θ , θ(lam) (qθ)
r(_)θ , θ(r) app(q, q′)θ , θ(app) (qθ) (q′θ)
t(q, q′)θ , θ(t) (qθ) (q′θ) let(q, uA.q′)θ , θ(let) (qθ) (q′θ)
β(_,_)θ , θ(β) trpl({})θ , θ(trpl[])
β(_,_)θ , θ(β) trpl({q/ψ,
−−−→
q′/ψ′})θ , θ(trpl::) (qθ) (trpl({
−−−→
q′/ψ′})θ)
ti(_,_)θ , θ(ti)
The twin operation qϑ, which produces a term by structural recursion on q, is defined
similarly, by replacing each occurrence of θ with ϑ.
I Example 4. For profiling purposes, we might be interested in counting the number of
computation steps that have happened thus far in an audited unit. This can be accomplished
by means of a trail replacement ϑ+ such that:
ϑ+(ψ) =

1 if ψ = β,β, ti
λx.x if ψ = lam
λx, y.x+ y if ψ = t,app, let, trpl::
0 else
This trail replacement counts 1 for each reduction step (β,β, ti); the cases for transitivity
and congruences add together the recursive results for subtrails; the last clause ignores other
constructors, most notably r and ti[], which are not reduction steps and do not have subtrails.
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2.3 Substitutions
λhc employs two notions of substitution, one for each kind of variable supported by the
language:
Simple variable substitution, which is not history-aware, is applied to codes, types, or
terms and maps a simple variable to, respectively, a code or a term; we denote it by [t/a]
or [N/a], which can also be written γ for short.
Audited variable substitution, which is history-aware, is applied to codes or terms and
maps an audited variable to, respectively, a code t or a tuple (N, q, t); we denote it by
[t/u] or [(N, q, t)/u], which can also be written δ for short.
We will also use the letter η to refer to either of the two flavors of substitution when more
precision is not needed.
I Definition 5 (substitution on codes). Substitution of simple and audited variables on a
code r (r[s/a] and r[s/u]) is defined as usual (avoiding variable capture). The full definition
is shown in Appendix B.1.
Each of the two substitutions on codes is extended to trails and types in the obvious
way, by traversing the trail or type until a subexpression containing a code s is found, then
resorting to substitution on s. To define substitution on terms, we first need auxiliary
definitions of the source and target of a trail:
I Definition 6. The source and target of a trail q (src(q) and tgt(q)) are defined as follows:
src(r(s)) , s tgt(r(s)) , s
src(t(q1, q2)) , src(q1) tgt(t(q1, q2)) , tgt(q2)
src(β(aA.s1, s2)) , (λaA.s1) s2 tgt(β(aA.s1, s2)) , s1 [s2/a]
src(β(s1, vA.s2)) , let(vA := !s1, s2) tgt(β(s1, vA.s2)) , s2 [s1/v]
src(ti(q′, θ)) , ι(θ) tgt(ti(q′, θ)) , q′θ
The omitted cases are routine and shown in Appendix B.2.
A valid trail q represents evidence that src(q) reduces to tgt(q) (we formally state this result
in the next section).
We omit the definition of simple variable substitution on terms for brevity (it is similar
to the corresponding substitution on codes). The definition of audited variable substitution
on terms, however, deserves some more explanation: since this substitution arises from the
unpacking of a bang term, which contains a trail we need to take care of, it takes the form
[(N, q, t)/u], where q is the computation history that led from the code t to the term N .
For related reasons, this substitution can be applied to a term to produce both a new
term and a corresponding trail: the two operations are written M ×δ and M nδ, respectively.
I Definition 7 (audited variable substitution (terms)). The operations M × [(N, q, t)/u] and
M n [(N, q, t)/u] are defined as follows:
un [(N, q, t)/u] , N (!q′R)n [(N, q, t)/u] , !t(q′[t/u],R×[(N,q,t)/u])(R n [(N, q, t)/u])
u× [(N, q, t)/u] , q (!q′R)× [(N, q, t)/u] , r(!(src(q′) [t/u]))
The omitted cases are routine and shown in Appendix B.3. The main feature of interest here
is that when we n-substitute (N, q, t) for u in an audited unit !q′ , we need to augment the
trail with a step showing how the replaced occurrence of u evaluated from t to N , as well as
substituting for other occurrences of u; the corresponding case of ×-substitution returns the
appropriate reflexivity trail, since no trail escapes a bang as a result of substitution.
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I Example 8. We consider again the term from Example 1:
! let(uN := !q2, let(vN := !q′6, u+ v))
Audited variable substitution is used to reduce let-! combinations; for example, to reduce the
outer let in the example, we need to compute
let(vN := !q′6, u+ v)n [2, q, src(q)/u] = let(vN := !q′6, 2 + v)
let(vN := !q′6, u+ v)× [2, q, src(q)/u] = let(r,app(app(r, q), r))
(we assume that the infix notation for + is syntactic sugar for two nested applications).
2.4 Type system
We now introduce typing rules for codes, trails, and terms. These rules use three corresponding
judgments with the following shape:
∆; Γ ` s : A s has type A
∆; Γ ` q : s .=A t q witnesses s reducing to t, with type A
∆; Γ `M : A | s M has type A and code s
The environments ∆ and Γ are list of type declarations for audited and simple variables
respectively, in the form u :: A or a : A.
Figure 2 shows the typing rules of the language. In the rules for codes, if we forget for a
moment about trail inspections, it is easy to recognize Pfenning and Davies’s judgmental
presentation of modal logic. The rules for terms are very similar, the biggest difference being
found in rule T-Bang: to typecheck !qM , we first obtain the type A and code t for M ;
then we typecheck the trail q to ensure that it has type A and target t; if both checks are
successful, we can return JsKA as the type of the expression, and !s as its code, where s is
the source of q. This also shows that when we say that !s is the code of !qM , we mean that
the term is the result of reducing the code, and the trail q records the computation history.
The rules for trail inspection, both as a code and as a term, rely on an auxiliary definition
of T B, which is a function from inspection branch labels to the corresponding type; it
depends on the superscript B, which refers to the output type of the inspection. The rule
for inspection codes (TI) checks that the types of all the branches in θ match their labels.
This requires θ to be defined on the default branch d to guarantee that the inspection is
exhaustively defined. We define T B as follows:
T B(ψ) ,

B (ψ = d, r,β,β, ti, iti, trpl[])
B ⊃ B (ψ = lam, itb[])
B ⊃ B ⊃ B (ψ = t,app, let, itb::, trpl::)
Rather than typecheck a term to compute its code, we can define a function performing
this operation directly.
I Definition 9. The code of a term M (notation: cd(M)) is the code obtained by replacing
all occurrences of !qN with !src(q). The full definition is shown in Appendix B.4.
The rule T-Bang, which typechecks audited terms, needs to compute the type of a
trail: this is performed by the typechecking rules for trails. Each of these rules typechecks a
different trail constructor: in particular, four rules define the contraction of redexes (Q-β,
Q-β, Q-TI), Q-Refl and Q-Trans ensure that trails induce a preorder on codes, and the
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∆; Γ ` s : A
a : A ∈ Γ Var∆; Γ ` a : A
∆; Γ, a : A ` s : B ⊃ I
∆; Γ ` λaA.s : A ⊃ B
∆; Γ ` s : A ⊃ B ∆; Γ ` t : A ⊃ E∆; Γ ` s t : B
u :: A ∈ ∆ mVar∆; Γ ` u : A
∆; · ` t : A
I∆; Γ ` !t : JtKA ∆; Γ ` s : JrKA ∆, u :: A; Γ ` t : C E∆; Γ ` let(uA := s, t) : C [r/u]
d ∈ dom(θ)
[
∆; · ` θ(ψ) : T B(ψ)
]
ψ∈dom(θ)
TI∆; Γ ` ι(θ) : B
∆; Γ `M : A | s
a : A ∈ Γ T-Var∆; Γ ` a : A | a
∆; Γ, a : A `M : B | s
T-Abs
∆; Γ ` λaA.M : A ⊃ B | λaA.s
∆; Γ `M : A ⊃ B | s ∆; Γ ` N : A | t
T-App∆; Γ `M N : B | s t
u :: A ∈ ∆ T-mVar∆; Γ ` u : A | u
∆; · `M : A | t ∆; · ` q : s .=A t
T-Bang∆; Γ ` !qM : JsKA | !s
∆; Γ `M : JrKA | s ∆, u :: A; Γ ` N : C | t
T-Let
∆; Γ ` let(uA := M,N) : C [r/u] | let(uA := s, t)
d ∈ dom(ϑ) dom(ϑ) = dom(θ)
[
∆; · ` ϑ(ψ) : T B(ψ) | θ(ψ)
]
ψ∈dom(ϑ)
T-TI∆; Γ ` ι(ϑ) : B | ι(θ)
∆; Γ ` q : s .=A t
∆; Γ ` s : A Q-Refl
∆; Γ ` r(s) : s .=A s
∆; Γ ` q1 : r .=A s ∆; Γ ` q2 : s .=A t Q-Trans
∆; Γ ` t(q1, q2) : r .=A t
∆; Γ, a : A ` s : B ∆; Γ ` t : A Q-β
∆; Γ ` β(aA.s, t) : (λaA.s) t .=B s [t/a]
∆; · ` s : A ∆, u :: A; Γ ` t : C Q-β
∆; Γ ` β(s, uA.t) : let(uA := !s, t) .=C[s/u] t [s/u]
d ∈ dom(ϑ) ∆; · ` q : s .=A t
[
∆; · ` θ(ψ) : T B(ψ)
]
ψ∈dom(θ) Q-TI
∆; Γ ` ti(q, θ) : ι(θ) .=B qθ
∆; Γ, a : A ` q : s .=B t Q-Abs
∆; Γ ` lam(aA.q) : λaA.s .=A⊃B λaA.t
∆; Γ ` q1 : s1 .=A⊃B t1 ∆; Γ ` q2 : s2 .=A t2 Q-App
∆; Γ ` app(q1, q2) : s1 s2 .=B t1 t2
∆; Γ ` q1 : s1 .=JrKA t1 ∆, u :: A; Γ ` q2 : s2 .=C t2 Q-Let
∆; Γ ` let(q1, uA.q2) : let(uA := s1, s2) .=C[r/u] let(uA := t1, t2)
d ∈ dom(ζ) dom(ζ) = dom(θ) = dom(θ′)
[
∆; · ` ζ(ψ) : θ(ψ) .=T B(ψ) θ′(ψ)
]
ψ∈dom(ζ) Q-Trpl
∆; Γ ` trpl(ζ) : ι(θ) .=B ι(θ′)
Figure 2 Typing rules for λhc
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remaining rules model congruence with respect to all code constructors but bangs. Let us
remark that the trail q mentioned in trail inspections cannot be synthesized from the redex
(since codes are not history-aware), but must be provided as an argument to ti.
We can prove that operations of Definitions 6 and 9 match the typing judgments:
I Lemma 10. If ∆; Γ ` q : s .=A t then src(q) = s and tgt(q) = t.
I Lemma 11. If ∆; Γ `M : A | s then cd(M) = s.
2.5 Semantics
In this section, we define a reduction relation expressing how terms compute to values.
Reduction differs from trails since it relates terms (rather than codes), and since unlike trails
it does not appear as part of terms (however, it is defined in such a way that reduced terms
will contain modified trails expressing a log of reduction).
Our definition of reduction makes use of contexts, i.e. terms with holes, represented by
black boxes (); similarly, we provide a notion of trail contexts, denoted by Q. The notation
E [M ] indicates the term obtained by filling the hole in E with M ; Q[q] is defined similarly.
E ::=  | λaA.E | (E M) | (M E) | !qE | let(uA := E ,M) | let(uA := M, E) | ι({−−−→M/ψ, E/ψ′,
−−−→
N/ψ′′})
Q ::=  | t(Q, q) | t(q,Q) | app(Q, q) | app(q,Q) | lam(aA.Q) | let(Q, uA.q) | let(q, uA.Q)
| trpl({−−→q1/ψ,Q/ψ′,
−−−→
q2/ψ
′′})
Following [9] we use F to refer to contexts that do not allow holes inside bangs. Box-free
contexts F and trail contexts Q are related by the following definition:
I Definition 12 (canonical trail context). For every F , there exists a canonical trail context
QF , defined as follows:
Q ,  Q(F M) , app(QF , r(cd(M)))
Q(M F) , app(r(cd(M)),QF ) QλaA.F , lam(aA.QF )
Qlet(F,uA.M) , let(QF , u.r(cd(M))) Qlet(M,uA.F) , let(r(cd(M)), uA.QF )
Q
ι({−−−→M/ψ,F/ψ′,
−−−−→
N/ψ′′}) , trpl({
−−−−−−−−→
r(cd(M))/ψ,QF/ψ′.
−−−−−−−−−→
r(cd(N))/ψ′′})
Informally, QF uses congruences to express a reflexive trail for F , with a hole as the subtrail
corresponding to the hole in F . It is QF that is responsible for producing the app congruence
of Example 2.
Thanks to trail contexts and our definition of audited variable substitution, we can define
reduction directly, without an auxiliary judgment pushing trails towards the closest outer
bang. To avoid dealing with the unwanted situation of trail inspections not guarded by a
bang, we only consider terms surrounded by an outer bang.
The reduction rules are defined in Figure 3. They operate by contracting a subterm
appearing in a context F , at the same time updating the trail of the enclosing bang by
asserting that q is followed by a new contraction appearing in the trail context QF . Rule
B-β is an exception, in that after performing the β contraction, we still need to take into
account the residuals of q′, expressed by the substitution N × [(M, q′, src(q′))/u]
We write s t when there exists a well-typed q such that src(q) = s and tgt(q) = t.
I Example 13. We take again the term from Example 1 and reduce the outer let as follows:
! let(uN := !q2, let(vN := !q′6, u+ v)) !qf let(vN := !q′6, 2 + v)
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B-β
!qF [(λaA.M) N)] !t(q,QF [β(a.cd(M),cd(N))])F [M [N/a]]
M  N B-Bang!qF [M ] !qF [N ]
qf = t(q,QF [t(β(src(q′), cd(N)), N × [(M, q′, src(q′))/u])]) B-β!qF [let(!q′M,u.N)] !qfF [N n [(M, q′, src(q′))/u]]
B-TI!qF [ι(ϑ)] !t(q,QF [ti(q,cd(ϑ))])F [qϑ]
Figure 3 Term reduction rules for λhc
where we use the substitutions we computed in Example 8. Since the reduction happens
immediately inside the bang, we use rule B-β with Q = , thus qf is as follows:
qf = t(r, t(β(src(q), u.cd(let(v := !q′6, u+ v)), let(r,app(app(r, q), r))))
= t(r, t(β(1 + 1, u. let(v := ! fact 3, u+ v)), let(r,app(app(r, q), r))))
(where src and cd compute according to the hypotheses we made about q and q′).
I Example 14. To show how to use the profiling inspection from Example 4, we need to
assume a certain evaluation strategy: for example, call-by-value. We then write (x←M ;N)
as syntactic sugar for (λx.N) M and evaluate the following term:
! (t0 ← ι(ϑ+);
_← ((λx, y, p.p x y) 2) 6;
t1 ← ι(ϑ+);
t1 − t0)
In this term, t0 evaluates to 0 because the bang starts with a reflexive trail; by the time we
get to the third line, the outer trail contains a log of the inspection on the first line, the two
beta reductions needed to evaluate the second line, and two more beta reductions to account
for sequential compositions: thus t1 evaluates to 5; finally, we evaluate t1 − t0 = 5.
I Definition 15 (normal form). A term M is in normal form iff for all trails q and all terms
N , !qM 6 N . Likewise, a code is in normal form iff there exists no t 6= s such that s t.
It should be noted that λhc, despite being strongly normalizing (as we will prove in the
next section), is not confluent: the same term may reduce to different values under different
reduction strategies. In particular, the trails appearing in bangs are sensitive to the reduction
order: a call-by-value strategy and a call-by-name strategy will produce different trails. We
could recover confluence by forcing a certain evaluation strategy and quotienting trails by
means of a suitable equivalence relation: this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The main properties of λhc, such as subject reduction, can be proved similarly to those
for λh. As explained in Section 1, we also need to establish the consistency of trails as proofs
of reducibility.
I Theorem 16. For all codes s, t of λhc in normal form such that s 6= t, there exist no
∆,Γ, q, A such that ∆; Γ ` q : s .=A t
Proof. If such a judgment were provable, by structural induction on it we would be able to
show that q must be a combination of reflexivity, transitivity, and congruence rules (since
both s and t are in normal form, no contraction is possible in absence of symmetry). Then
s = t, which falsifies the hypothesis. J
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3 Strong Normalization
We now summarize our proof of strong normalization for λhc. The presence of a recursion
operator on trails, whose occurrences can be arbitrarily nested, together with the fact that
trails grow monotonically during execution, makes this result non-trivial.
Our proof employs the well-known notion of “candidates of reducibility” [13] (sets of
strongly normalizing terms enjoying certain desirable properties). Candidates of reducibility
are a powerful and flexible tool, which has been used to prove the strong normalization
property of very expressive lambda calculi [12, 18, 26] and also other results such as the
Church-Rosser property [11].
In the literature, it is possible to find several definitions of candidate of reducibility:
along with Girard’s definition, we can cite Tait’s saturated sets [24] and Parigot’s inductive
definition [19]. Our proof employs Girard’s candidates, and can be easily compared to the
similar proof for the System F [14]. Some acquaintance with that proof will be assumed in
the rest of this section. We will use SN to denote the set of all strongly normalizing terms.
Reduction on strongly normalizing terms is a well-founded relation, which allows us to reason
by well-founded induction on it.
3.1 A simplified calculus
As a technical means to investigate normalization of λhc, we define λhs, a simplified version
of the calculus which forgets about trails associated with box introductions. Its types, terms,
and contexts are defined by the following grammar:
τ, σ ::= P | τ ⊃ σ | τ
s, t, . . . ::= a | u | λaτ .s | (s t) | !s | let(uτ := s, t) | ι(θ)
θ, θ′, . . . ::= {−−→s/ψ}
E ::=  | λaτ .E | (E s) | (s E) | !E | let(uτ := E , s) | let(uτ := s, E) | ι({−−→s/ψ, E/ψ′,−−→t/ψ′′})
The terms of λhs correspond closely to the codes of λhc. Their semantics, however, is different:
ι(θ) does not perform inspection on the trail of the enclosing bang, but at the time of its
evaluation will receive an arbitrary trail. We omit the definition of trails for brevity, but it
can be obtained from the corresponding notion in λhc, by replacing codes with λhs terms.
We can also define simple and audited variable substitution on λhs terms, in a way that
mimics the corresponding notion of λhc (Definition 5).
We provide an erasure map from λhc types and terms to λhs (its extension to contexts is
immediate).
|P | = P |A ⊃ B| = |A| ⊃ |B| | JsKA| = |A|
|a| , a |u| , u |λaA.M | , λa|A|.|M | |M N | , |M | |N |
|!qM | , !|M | | let(uA := M,N)| , let(uA := |M |, |N |) |ι(ϑ)| , ι(|ϑ|)
The typing rules and reduction rules for λhs are given in Figures 4 and 5. They are
similar to their counterparts in λhc, but greatly simplified: in particular, trail inspection is
allowed to reduce by nondeterministically picking any trail.
Unsurprisingly, erasure preserves well-typedness and reduction:
I Lemma 17. If ∆; Γ `λhc M : A|s, then ∆; Γ `λhs |M | : |A|.
I Lemma 18. M  λhc N =⇒ |M | λhs |N |
By the combination of Lemma 17 and Lemma 18, we know that if λhs is strongly
normalizing, then λhc must also, a fortiori, be strongly normalizing. We will thus proceed to
prove SN in the simpler system, and extend it to λhc as a corollary.
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a : τ ∈ Γ
∆; Γ ` a : τ
u :: τ ∈ ∆
∆; Γ ` u : τ
∆; Γ, a : τ `M : σ
∆; Γ ` λaτ .M : τ ⊃ σ
∆; · `M : τ
∆; Γ ` !M : τ
∆; Γ `M : τ ⊃ σ
∆; Γ ` N : τ
∆; Γ `M N : σ
∆; Γ `M : τ
∆, u :: τ ; Γ ` N : σ
∆; Γ ` let(uτ := M,N) : σ
d ∈ dom(θ)
[∆; · ` θ(ψ) : T σ(ψ)]ψ∈dom(θ)
∆; Γ ` ι(θ) : σ
Figure 4 Typing rules for λhs terms
((λa.s) t) s [t/a] let(!s, u.t) s [t/u] ι(θ) qθ s tE [s] E [t]
Figure 5 Reduction rules for λhs terms
3.2 Summary of the proof
We now give the definition of candidates of reducibility à la Girard.
I Definition 19 (neutral term). A term is neutral if it is not of the form λaA.s or !s.
I Definition 20 (candidates of reducibility). A set C of terms is a candidate of reducibility iff
it satisfies Girard’s CR conditions:
CR1 C ⊆ SN
CR2 s ∈ C ∧ s t =⇒ t ∈ C
CR3 s ∈ NT ∧ (∀t.s t =⇒ t ∈ C) =⇒ s ∈ C.
The set of candidates of reducibility will be denoted CR.
We identify certain subsets of candidates that are stable wrt. validity substitution:
I Definition 21 (substitutive sub-candidate). For all candidates C, validity variables u, and
sets of terms D, we define its substitutive subset CDu as CDu , {s ∈ C : ∀t ∈ D, s [t/u] ∈ C}.
Notice that sub-candidates are not in CR; they do, however, satisfy CR1 and CR2, which
is enough for us to use them in the definition of reducible sets.
I Definition 22 (reducible set). For all types τ , the set Redτ of reducible terms of type τ is
defined by recursion on τ as follows:
RedP = SN
Redτ⊃σ = {s : ∀t ∈ Redτ , (s t) ∈ Redσ}
Redτ = {s : ∀u,∀C ∈ CR,∀t ∈ CRedτu , let(u := s, t) ∈ C}
In particular, s ∈ Redτ if, and only if, for all reducibility candidates C and audited
variables u, if we take a term t ∈ CRedτu , then let(u := s, t) ∈ C. We are allowed to use Redτ
in CRedτu because τ is a subexpression of τ . thus we need to quantify over all candidates C.
I Lemma 23. For each type τ , Redτ ∈ CR.
I Theorem 24. Let ∆,Γ,−→η s.t. dom(−→η ) = dom(∆)∪ dom(Γ), for all u ∈ dom(∆),−→η (u) ∈
Red∆(u), and for all a ∈ dom(Γ),−→η (a) ∈ RedΓ(a). Then, ∆; Γ ` s : τ implies s−→η ∈ Redτ .
Proof. We use the standard technique for System F [14], with additional subproofs for
s ∈ Redτ =⇒ !s ∈ Redτ and (∀ψ ∈ dom(θ), θ(ψ) ∈ RedT σ(ψ)) =⇒ ι(θ) ∈ Redσ. SN
follows as a corollary when −→η is the identity substitution. J
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3.3 Formalization
We formalized λhc, together with our proof of strong normalization, in Nominal Isabelle.
Nominal Isabelle mechanizes the management of variable binding, relieving the user from the
burden of defining binding infrastructure (e.g. de Bruijn indices, lifting operations, etc.). On
the other hand, many of the definitions used in a nominal formalization must be proved to
be “well-behaved”, beyond what would usually be made explicit in a pencil-and-paper proof.
The main well-behavedness property required in Nominal Isabelle is equivariance, stating
that a function f or a set S is stable under finite permutations of names pi:
∀x.f(pi · x) = pi · f(x) ∀x.x ∈ S ⇐⇒ pi · x ∈ S
Most of the definitions used in the proof are equivariant, including typing and reduction rules,
the set SN of strongly normalizing terms, the set CR of reducibility candidates, reducibility
sets RedA for all types A, and the operator CDu .
We do not, however, prove equivariance for individual reducibility candidates C ∈ CR: on
the contrary, reducibility candidates do not need to be equivariant. To prove it, one can take
a closure operator [·] mapping a set of strongly normalizing terms to the smallest reducibility
candidate containing it (for its existence and definition see e.g. [23]): it is easy to see that,
for all variables a, b, !a ∈ [{!b}] if and only if a = b.
Our impredicative definition of Redτ , which quantifies over arbitrary candidates, is
handled gracefully by Nominal Isabelle. Lindley and Stark [17] show a technique (>>-lifting)
that can be adapted to provide a predicative definition of RedA. As it happens, the lower
logical complexity of >>-lifting relies on the additional definition of continuations, which
would require some more effort to be formalized. On the other hand, our approach seems
likely to extend to handle structural recursion (System T), following Aschieri and Zorzi [8],
or impredicative polymorphism (System F), following Girard et al. [14].
4 Related work
The first Justification Logic-style system, known as the Logic of Proofs, was introduced by
Artemov [6, 5]. Most work on justification logic systems (as for modal logic) is presented
via Hilbert-style axiom systems extending classical propositional logic. Pfenning and Davies’
judgemental reconstruction of modal logic [22] provides a natural deduction-style proof
system for (intuitionistic) modal logic with necessity and possibility modalities. Artemov
and Bonelli [7] introduced a system λI for justification logic, extending Pfenning and Davies’
treatment of necessity (A). They introduced equality proofs (trails) to recover subject
reduction and proved strong normalization for λI. Bavera and Bonelli later introduced (outer)
trail inspection as part of an extended calculus called λh [9] from which we took inspiration.
Our system λhc seems (at least to us) an improvement over λh: it is simpler, and avoids the
inconsistency arising from viewing trails as equivalence proofs. Nevertheless, the technique
we used to prove strong normalization in λhc seems to suffice for λh as well. The only
complication concerns the definition of reduction: while in λhc reduction acts non-locally by
updating the trail in the nearest enclosing bang, in λh reduction produces an intermediate
term annotated with a new local trail, and the trail in the enclosing bang is updated after a
sequence of permutation reductions:
!qF [M ] !qF [q′ . M ′] ∗ !q′′F [M ′]
It is thus necessary, though not overly complicated, to redefine reduction as a single-step
operation including permutation reductions, and prove its equivalence to the original definition.
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This allows us to remove intermediate terms q . M from the calculus altogether. In general,
the (efficient) reduction theory of systems such as λh and λhc deserves further study.
Our work is also partly motivated by previous work on provenance and tracing for
functional languages. Perera et al. [20] presented a pure, ML-like core language in which
program execution yields both a value and a trace, corresponding roughly to the large-step
operational derivation leading to the result. They gave trace slicing algorithms and techniques
for extracting program slices and differential slices from traces; in subsequent work Acar et
al. [3] explored security implications such as the disclosure and obfuscation properties of
traces [10]. Indeed, trail inspection can be considered as a generic mechanism for defining
provenance views as considered by these papers. Although Bavera and Bonelli [9] motivated
λh as a basis for history-based access control (following Abadi and Fournet [1]), we are
not aware of comparable work on provenance security based on justification logic. Our
ongoing investigation suggests that λh-style trails contain enough information to extract
many forms of provenance; however, to perform this extraction by means of trail inspection,
we would usually need to reverse beta-reductions, and in particular to undo the substitution
in beta-reduced terms. Since inspections treat beta and beta-box trails as black boxes, this
cannot be achieved in the current version of the calculus. An extension of the language
providing transparent beta trails and operations to undo substitutions is the subject of our
current study.
Audit has been considered by a number of security researchers recently, for example
Amir-Mohamedian et al. [4] consider correctness for audit logging, but auditing is again an
extralinguistic operation (implemented using aspect-oriented programming). Vaughan et
al. [25] introduced new formalisms for evidence-based audit. In Aura, an implementation of
this approach [15], dependently-typed programs execute in the presence of a policy specified
in authorization logic [2], and whenever a restricted resource is requested, a proof that access
is authorized is constructed at run time and stored in an audit log for later inspection. The
relationship between this approach and ours, and more generally between justification logic
and authorization logic, remains to be investigated.
5 Conclusions
The motivation for this work is the need to provide better foundations for audited computation,
as advocated in recent work on provenance and security and on type-theoretic forms of
justification logic such as λh. However, as we have shown, λh is at the same time overly
restrictive (in requiring affine variable and trail variable usage, i.e. forbidding copying
of ordinary data) and overly permissive: despite these restrictions aimed at keeping the
equational theory consistent, one can still prove any two compatibly-typed proof codes
equivalent, using symmetry and the nondeterministic equational law for trail inspection.
We presented a new calculus λhc based on justification logic that includes audit operations
such as trail inspection, but has fewer limitations and is simpler than λh. We show that λh
avoids this problem and has a consistent reduction theory. We also prove strong normalization
for λhc via a simplified system λhs, and we have mechanically checked the proof. This approach
also seems sufficient to prove SN for λh, though we have not formalized this result.
In future work, we intend to consider larger-scale programming languages based on the
ideas of λhc, investigate connections to provenance tracking and slicing techniques, and clarify
the security guarantees offered by justification logic-based audit.
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A The type system of λh
In Figures 6, 7, and 8, we provide the typing rules of Bavera and Bonelli’s λh for reference,
using syntax similar to that used in this paper.
A.1 Inconsistency of the equational theory of λh
In Section 1, we provided an informal derivation tree showing that the equational theory of
λh allows to equate any two proof codes of the same type. We give below a more accurate
(but isomorphic) derivation tree. Then, if we choose a θ such that θ(r) = s and θ(β) = t,
this effectively proves s = t, where s and t can be chosen freely:
·; ·; · ` r(s′) : s′ =B s′
·; ·; · ` θ : T A
EqTI·; ·;α : Eq(A) ` ti(θ, α) : r(s′)θ =A αθ
·; ·; · ` β(bB′ .t′, t′′) : t′ [t′′/b] =B′′ (λbB′ .t′) t′′
·; ·; · ` θ : T A
EqTI
·; ·;α : Eq(A) ` ti(θ, α) : β(bB′ .t′, t′′)θ =A αθ EqSym
·; ·;α : Eq(A) ` s(ti(θ, α)) : αθ =A β(bB′ .t′, t′′)θ EqTrans
·; ·;α : Eq(A) ` t(ti(θ, α), s(ti(θ, α))) : r(s′)θ =A β(bB′ .t′, t′′)θ
This derivation contains a lot of extraneous details, so we summarize the main features which
contribute to the final result. In this derivation, we use transitivity on two subderivations.
The right-hand subderivation shows that s = r(s′)θ is equal to αθ , using the rule EqTI.
Here, s′ is an arbitrary well-formed term of some type B. The EqTI rule allows us to
conclude that any code of the form qθ is equal to αθ, and here we have used q = r(s′).
In the second subderivation we use rule EqTI again to conclude that t = β(bB′ .t′, t′′)θ is
equivalent to αθ. Here, terms t′ ad t′′ are arbitrary well-formed terms of appropriate types to
form a redex λb.t′) t′′. We then use symmetry to show that αθ is equivalent to β(bB′ .t′, t′′)θ.
The desired conclusion follows. Since we can easily choose θ so that it returns one proof code
s when handling a reflexivity trail and a different proof code t when handling a β-redex trail,
the above derivation can be modified to prove that any two proof codes (of the same type A)
are equivalent.
Finally, in applying the transitivity rule EqTrans, it is important that this rule does
not require affine use of the trail variable α, so that it can be used in both subderivations.
Changing this might fix the above problem, but would also have unknown consequences
on the rest of the system. We have instead focused on an alternative system that does not
require trail variables or affineness, by removing the symmetry trail.
B Full definitions
B.1 Substitution on codes
For γ = [t/a] and δ = [t/u], we define substitution of simple and audited variables on a code
r (notation: rγ and rδ) as follows:
bγ , γ(b)
vγ , v
(λbA.s)γ , λbA.sγ (b#a, t)
(s s′)γ , (sγ) (s′γ)
(!s)γ , !s
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a : A ∈ Γ Var∆; Γ; Σ ` a : A
u : A[Σ] ∈ ∆ Σσ ⊆ Σ′
mVar∆; Γ; Σ′ ` 〈u, σ〉 : A
∆; Γ, a : A; Σ ` s : B ⊃ I
∆; Γ ` λaA.s : A ⊃ B
∆; Γ1; Σ1 ` s : A ⊃ B ∆; Γ2; Σ2 ` t : A ⊃ E∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` s t : B
∆; ·; Σ ` s : A ∆; ·; Σ ` q : s =A t I∆; Γ; Σ′ ` Σ.t : JΣ.tKA ∆; Γ1; Σ1 ` s : JΣ.rKA ∆, u : A[Σ]; Γ2; Σ2 ` t : C E∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` let(uA[Σ] := s, t) : C [Σ.r/u]
α : Eq(A) ∈ Σ ∆; ·; · ` θ : T B
TI∆; Γ; Σ ` αθ : B
∆; Γ; Σ ` s : A ∆; Γ; Σ ` q : s =A t Eq
∆; Γ; Σ ` t : A
Figure 6 Typing rules for λh proof codes
∆; Γ; Σ ` s : A
EqRefl
∆; Γ; Σ ` r(s) : s =A s
∆; Γ1, a : A; Σ1 ` s : A ⊃ B ∆; Γ2; Σ2 ` t : A Eqβ
∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` β(aA.s, t) : s [t/a] =B (λaA.s) t
∆; ·; Σ1 ` A|r ∆, u : A[Σ1]; Γ2; Σ2 ` C|t ∆; ·; Σ1 ` q : r =A s Γ2 ⊆ Γ3 Σ2 ⊆ Σ3 Eqβ
∆; Γ3; Σ3 ` β(Σ1.s, uA[Σ1].t) : t [Σ1.s/u] =C[Σ1.s/u] let(uA[Σ1] := s, t)
∆; ·; Σ1 ` q : s =A t ∆; ·; · ` T B |θ α : Eq(A) ∈ Σ2 EqTI
∆; Γ; Σ2 ` ti(ϑ, α) : qθ =B αθ
∆; Γ; Σ ` q : s =A t EqSym
∆; Γ; Σ ` s(q) : t =A s
∆; Γ; Σ ` q1 : r =A s ∆; Γ; Σ ` q2 : s =A t EqTrans
∆; Γ; Σ ` t(q1, q2) : r =A t
∆; Γ, a : A; Σ ` q : s =B t EqAbs
∆; Γ; Σ ` lam(aA.q) : λaA.s =A⊃B λaA.t
∆; Γ1; Σ1 ` q1 : s1 =A⊃B t1 ∆; Γ2; Σ2 ` q2 : s2 =A t2 EqApp
∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` app(q1, q2) : s1 s2 =B t1 t2
∆; Γ1; Σ1 ` q1 : s1 =JΣrKA t1 ∆, u : A[Σ]; Γ2; Σ2 ` q2 : s2 =C t2 EqLet
∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` let(q1, uA[Σ].q2) : let(uA[Σ] := s1, s2) =C[Σ.r/u] let(uA[Σ] := t1, t2)
α : Eq(A) ∈ Σ ∆; ·; · ` −→q : θ =T B θ′ EqTrpl
∆; Γ; Σ ` trpl(α,−→q ) : αθ =B αθ′
Figure 7 Typing rules for λh trails
a : A ∈ Γ TVar∆; Γ; Σ ` a : A | a
u : A[Σ] ∈ ∆ Σσ ⊆ Σ′
TmVar∆; ·; Σ′ ` 〈u, σ〉 : A | 〈u, σ〉
∆; Γ, a : A; Σ `M : B | s
TAbs
∆; Γ; Σ ` λaA.M : A ⊃ B | λaA.s
∆; Γ1; Σ1 `M : A ⊃ B | s ∆; Γ2; Σ2 ` N : A | t
TApp∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 `M N : B | s t
∆; ·; Σ `M : A | s ∆; ·; Σ ` q : s = t
TBox
∆; Γ; Σ′ ` !ΣqM : JΣ.tKA | Σ.t
∆; Γ1; Σ1 `M : JΣ.rKA | s ∆, u : A[Σ]; Γ2; Σ2 ` N : C | t
TLet
∆; Γ1,Γ2; Σ1,Σ2 ` let(uA[Σ] := M,N) : C [Σ.r/u] | let(uA[Σ] := s, t)
α : Eq(A) ∈ Σ ∆; ·; · ` ϑ : T B | θ
TTI∆; Γ; Σ ` αϑ : B | αθ
∆; Γ; Σ `M : A | s ∆; Γ; Σ ` q : s =A t TEq
∆; Γ; Σ ` q . M : A | t
Figure 8 Typing rules for λh terms
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let(vA := s, s′)γ , let(vA := sγ, s′γ) (v#t)
ι(θ)γ , ι(θγ)
bδ , b
vδ , δ(v)
(λbA.s)δ , λbA.sδ (b#t)
(s s′)δ , (sδ) (s′δ)
(!s)δ , !(sδ)
let(vA := s, s′)δ , let(vA := sδ, s′δ) (v#u, t)
ι(θ)δ , ι(θδ)
where θγ and θδ are defined pointwise and the notation γ(b) is defined as t if a = b, and as
b otherwise (δ(v) is defined similarly).
B.2 Source and target of a trail
The source and target of a trail q (notation: src(q) and tgt(q)) are defined as follows:
src(r(s)) , s
src(t(q1, q2)) , src(q1)
src(β(aA.s1, s2)) , (λaA.s1) s2
src(β(s1, vA.s2)) , let(vA := !s1, s2)
src(ti(q′, θ)) , ι(θ)
src(lam(aA.q′)) , λaA.src(q′)
src(app(q′, q′′)) , (src(q′) src(q′′))
src(let(q′, vA.q′′)) , let(vA := src(q′), src(q′′))
src(trpl(ζ)) , ι(src(ζ))
tgt(r(s)) , s
tgt(t(q1, q2)) , tgt(q2)
tgt(β(aA.s1, s2)) , s1 [s2/a]
tgt(β(s1, vA.s2)) , s2 [s1/v]
tgt(ti(q′, θ)) , q′θ
tgt(lam(aA.q′)) , λaA.tgt(q′)
tgt(app(q′, q′′)) , (tgt(q′) tgt(q′′))
tgt(let(q′, vA.q′′)) , let(vA := tgt(q′), tgt(q′′))
tgt(trpl(ζ)) , ι(tgt(ζ))
where src(ζ) and tgt(ζ) are defined pointwise.
B.3 Audited variable substitution
Given δ = [(N, q, t)/u], fix δ′ = [t/u]. Then, the operations M × δ and M n δ are defined as
follows:
a× δ , r(a)
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v × δ ,
{
q (u = v)
r(v) (u 6= v)
(λaA.R)× δ , lam(aA.R× δ) (♥)
(R S)× δ , app(R× δ, S × δ)
(!q′R)× δ , r(!(src(q′)δ′))
let(vA := R,S)× δ , let(R× δ, vA.S × δ) (♠)
ι(ϑ)× δ , trpl(ϑ× δ)
an δ , a
v n δ ,
{
N (u = v)
v (u 6= v)
(λaA.R)n δ , λaA.R n δ (♥)
(R S)n δ , (R n δ) (S n δ)
(!q′R)n δ , !t(q′δ′,R×δ)(R n δ)
let(vA := R,S)n δ , let(vA := R n δ, u.S n δ) (♠)
ι(ϑ)n δ , ι(ϑn δ)
(♥) a#N, q, t (♠) v#u,N, q, t
where ϑ× δ and ϑn δ are defined pointwise on ϑ.
B.4 Codes
The code of a term M (notation: cd(M)) is defined as follows:
cd(a) , a
cd(u) , u
cd(λaA.N) , λaa.cd(N)
cd(N R) , (cd(N) cd(R))
cd(!qN) , !src(q)
cd(let(uA := N,R)) , let(uA := cd(N), cd(R))
cd(ι(ϑ)) , ι(cd(ϑ))
where cd(ϑ) is defined pointwise.
C Proofs
C.1 Strong normalization
The proofs of strong normalization and related lemmata were only sketched because of space
constraints. This appendix provides more detailed proofs and explanations, which summarize
the mechanized formalization in Nominal Isabelle. For convenience, we explicitly state the
well-founded induction principle we use in some of the following proofs:
I Theorem 25 (induction principle for well-founded relations). Let R ⊆ X ×X a well-founded
relation on some set X, and P ⊆ X a predicate on the same set. Suppose that if x ∈ X and
for all y ∈ X such that y R x we have P y, then P x. Then, P z holds for all z ∈ X.
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The principle can also be applied to tuples of strongly normalizing terms by taking the
lexicographic extension of the reduction relation, which is also well-founded.
Some standard results hold in λhs. The following substitution lemma can be proved by a
routine induction.
I Lemma 26 (substitution lemma).
1. a#r =⇒ s [t/a] [r/u] = s [r/u] [t [r/u]/a]
2. u#v, r =⇒ s [t/u] [r/v] = s [r/v] [t [r/v]/u]
Consequently, we can prove the substitutivity of reduction.
I Lemma 27 (substitutivity of reduction). s t =⇒ s [r/u] t [r/u]
Proof. By induction on the derivation of reduction, using Lemma 26. J
We mentioned that our proof of strong normalization uses candidates of reducibility
(Definition 20): however, we found it convenient to also use a more general notion that we
call pre-candidate of reducibility after Petit [21].
I Definition 28 (pre-candidates of reducibility). A set C of terms is a pre-candidate of
reducibility iff it satisfies Girard’s CR1 and CR2 conditions:
CR1 C ⊆ SN
CR2 s ∈ C ∧ s t =⇒ t ∈ C
The set of pre-candidates of reducibility will be denoted PCR.
Substitutive sub-candidates of a candidate are pre-candidates.
I Lemma 29. CDu ∈ PCR
Proof. Since CDu ⊆ C, CR1 follows immediately. To prove CR2, we assume s ∈ CDu and
s  s′. By Lemma 27, we prove that for all t ∈ D, s [t/u]  s′ [t/u]. From CR2 on the
candidate C, we know s′ ∈ C, thus s′ ∈ CDu , which implies the thesis. J
I Remark. We easily see that CR3 cannot hold for CDu , meaning it is a pre-candidate but not
a candidate, even if D were assumed to be a candidate. Otherwise, we would know u ∈ CDu ,
and consequently for all N ∈ D we would have u [N/u] = N ∈ C. Hence, all candidates
would need to be equal, but we know that there exist at least two different candidates: SN
and the set of all variables.
Some other immediate results about reducibility candidates, whose proof is standard,
follow.
I Lemma 30.
1. SN ∈ CR
2. for all C ∈ CR and s ∈ NT in normal form, s ∈ C
3. in particular, for all reducibility candidates C and all variables x, x ∈ C.
Proof of Lemma 23
For each type τ , Redτ ∈ CR.
We prove that Redτ satisfies the CR conditions by structural induction on τ . We only
consider the Redτ case and invite the interested reader to see [14] for atomic and function
types.
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CR1 given s ∈ Redτ , we prove that let(u := s, v) ∈ SN , with u 6= v (this follows from
the definition of Redτ , taking C = SN , t = v, and noticing that v [s′/u] = v for all
s′ ∈ Redτ ). Then s is a subterm of a strongly normalizing term, thus s ∈ SN as well.
CR2 given s ∈ Redτ and r s.t. s r, we need to prove that r ∈ Redτ . By the definition
of reducibility, we need to show that for all C and for all t ∈ CRedτu , let(u := r, t) ∈ C.
Since s ∈ Redτ , by definition we have let(u := s, t) ∈ C and, since C ∈ CR, we can
perform a one step reduction and obtain let(u := r, t) ∈ C as needed.
CR3 given s neutral such that whenever s s′ we have s′ ∈ Redτ , we need to prove that
s ∈ Redτ : in other words, we assume t ∈ CRedτu for some candidate C, and we need
to prove that let(u := s, t) ∈ C. Since CRedτu is a pre-candidate (Lemma 29), by CR1
t ∈ SN and we can reason by well-founded induction. We consider all possible reducts of
let(u := s, t):
let(u := s, t)  let(u := s′, t) with s  s′: we know by hypothesis that s′ ∈ Redτ ,
thus we have let(u := s′, t) ∈ C by definition of reducibility;
let(u := s, t)  let(u := s, t′) with t  t′: by CR2 on pre-candidates we know that
t′ ∈ CRedτu and we obtain by the inner induction hypothesis on t′ that let(u := s, t′) ∈ C;
no other possible reduct, since s is neutral.
Then by CR3 on C, we know let(u := s, t) ∈ C, as needed.
I Lemma 31. s ∈ Redτ =⇒ !s ∈ Redτ
Proof. To prove that !s ∈ Redτ , we need to show that for all choices of C and t ∈ CRedτu ,
we have let(u := !s, t) ∈ C. Since s ∈ Redτ and t ∈ C, by CR1 both terms are strongly
normalizing, and we can reason by well-founded induction: then we consider all reducts of
let(u := !s, t):
let(u := !s′, t) with s s′: we know s′ ∈ Redτ (by CR2), then by induction hypothesis
let(u := !s′, t) ∈ C;
let(u := !s, t′) with t  t′: by CR2 on pre-candidates we prove t′ ∈ CRedτu , then by
induction hypothesis let(u := !s, t′) ∈ C;
t [s/u]: since s ∈ Redτ and t ∈ CRedτu , we have t [s/u] ∈ C.
Then we obtain let(u := !s, t) ∈ C by CR3. J
I Lemma 32. (∀ψ ∈ dom(θ), θ(ψ) ∈ RedT σ(ψ)) =⇒ ι(θ) ∈ Redσ
Proof. Similarly to the previous lemma, all the terms in the codomain of θ (which form a
finite tuple) are strongly normalizing, thus we can reason by well-founded induction. We
thus consider all reducts of ι(θ):
ι(θ′) where θ′ is obtained from θ by means of a one-step reduction of a single term
in its codomain, keeping all the other terms the same: we easily prove that for all ψ,
θ′(ψ) ∈ RedT σ(ψ) (using CR2), then by induction hypothesis we have ι(θ′) ∈ Redσ;
qθ: by an inner induction on the structure of q, we prove that qθ ∈ Redσ.
We thus obtain ι(θ) ∈ Redσ by CR3. J
We now prove strong normalization for λhs. The theorem can be stated in a more elegant
way by means of the following definition.
I Definition 33 (adapted interpretation). Given contexts ∆ and Γ, a sequence of substitutions
−→η = η1, . . . , ηn is a (∆; Γ)-adapted interpretation (notation: −→η  ∆; Γ) if and only if:
dom(−→η ) = dom(∆) ∪ dom(Γ)
for all u ∈ dom(∆) we have −→η (u) ∈ Red∆(u)
for all a ∈ dom(Γ) we have −→η (a) ∈ RedΓ(a).
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Proof of Theorem 24
If ∆; Γ ` s : τ , then for all −→η  ∆; Γ we have s−→η ∈ Redτ .
By induction on the typing derivation. We consider the interesting cases:
s = !s′, τ = σ and, by induction hypothesis, for all (∆; ·)-adapted interpretations −→η′ (!
is opaque to truth variables, so the corresponding context is empty) s′
−→
η′ ∈ Redσ. We
choose
−→
η′ to be equal to −→η restricted to ∆: then (!s)η = !(sη′) and the thesis follows
from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 31.
s = let(u := R,S), and (by induction hypotheses), Rη′ ∈ Redσ (for all (∆; Γ)-adapted
η′) and Sη′′ ∈ Redτ (for all (∆, u :: σ; Γ)-adapted η′′), with u chosen to be fresh. Since
clearly R−→η ∈ Redσ, by the definition of Redσ it suffices to show that S−→η ∈ (Redτ )Redσu
to prove let(u := R,S)η = let(u := Rη, Sη) ∈ Redτ . This is equivalent to proving that
S−→η ∈ Redτ and S−→η [t/u] ∈ Redτ for all t ∈ Redσ: both statements are implied by the
induction hypothesis on S.
s = ι(θ) and (by induction hypothesis) for all ψ, for all (∆, ·)-adapted interpretations η′
we have θ(ψ) ∈ RedT τψ. We choose η′ to be the suitable restriction of η and we obtain
ι(θ)η = ι(θη′) ∈ Redτ by Lemma 32.
The two corollaries we are interested in follow immediately.
I Corollary 34 (strong normalization for λhs). If ∆; Γ `λhs s : τ , then s ∈ SN .
Proof. Immediately from Theorem 24, by replacing −→η with the identity substitution. J
I Corollary 35 (strong normalization for λhc). If ∆; Γ `λhc M : A|s, then M ∈ SN .
Proof. By combining Corollary 34 with Lemma 17 and Lemma 18. J
